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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
NICK M. VRONTIKIS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

DOROTHY MAE JENSON
VRONTIKIS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case
No. 9252

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
The plaintiff respondent does not agree with defendant
appellant's staten1ent of facts because it contains arguments,
conclusions, innuendos and matters not in issue.
With the court's indulgence, plaintiff respondent states
the facts to be as follows:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for a divorce commenced by the plaintiff.
The parties were married October 30, 1952. There were no
children born as an issue (R. 4).
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The case was tried on the issues as presented by the
plaintiff's amended complaint (R. 20), and defendant's
answer and counter claim (R. 34), the court having on motion
of the defendant set aside the antenuptial agreement which
formed a part of plaintiff's amended complaint.
The court heard the matter, which lasted two days and
made its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 86), and
based on the findings made its decree awarding the plaintiff
respondent a divorce and dismissed defendant's counterclaim (R. 94-125).
The court found that the plaintiff earned a salary in the
sum of $450.00 per month before deductions, and that the
parties to the proceedings acquired an equity in a home
amounting to $9,500.00, some furniture and furnishings and
appliances ( R. 86-8; R. 90) .
That the plaintiff was the owner of 10,000 shares of stock
in the Vrontikis Brothers, Inc., valued at $1,000.00; and a
promissory note issued by V rontikis Brothers, Inc., in 1954
in the amount of $10,000.00, which was pledged to First
Security Bank by the corporation in order to enable the corporation to sustain credit by borrowing; and several issues of
uranium stocks of no value (R. 121).
The court awarded the defendant appellant $3,000.00
property settlement, $150.00 support and alimony for one
year, household furniture and appliances and $1,000.00 attorneys fees and costs (R. 125). The court further ordered the
plaintiff to pay and discharge all medical expenses such as
doctor fees and hospital expenses incurred to date by the
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defendant; that all the rest and remainder of the property
belonging to the parties was awarded to the plaintiff (R. 125-6).
Plaintiff appellant sold the equity which the parties had
to the property described in the decree for the sum of
$10,000.00 (R. 177). That plaintiff, after the sale of the equity,
deposited with the Clerk of Court the sum of $4,006.80;
$3,006.80 payment to defendant appellant as by order of court
and $1,000.00 for the use and benefit of her attorneys (R. 155).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING
CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF THE PLAINTIFF ON THE
GROUNDS THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO LAY ANY
FOUNDATION FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
TESTIMONY.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL AS NO SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN EFFECTED
BY ANY RULING OF THE COURT.

POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF WAS A RESIDEN_,T OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FOR MORE THAN THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION.

POINT IV.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF
WAS THE OWNER OF STOCK OF GUNSITE BUTTE
URANIUM CORPORATION.

POINT V.
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT BONUS PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF BY VRONTIKIS BROTHERS
CORPORATION WERE DIVIDENDS IS NOT BASED
UPON FACT, LAW, OR REASON.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WILL NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL UNLESS A CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IS SHOWN.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING
CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF THE PLAINTIFF ON THE
GROUNDS THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO LAY ANY
FOUNDATION FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
TESTIMONY.
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In Point One of defendant's brief, she sets forth certain
excerpts from the transcript relative to certain alleged conduct
of the plaintif-f. Defendant has seen fit to omit from her brief
other testimony relating to this same issue. The following is the
record:
Q. (By Mr. Gee) (!When were you out of the country this
last year?
A. (Mr. V rontikis) February.
Q. February 1959?
A. Yes.

*

*

*

*

Q. Who accompanied you to Mexico?
MR. N. J. COTRO-MANES: I object to all this cross
examination as improper, not proper cross examination and
on the further ground that there is nothing in the pleadings
to substantiate this.
THE COURT: Well, this is an equitable proceedings.
I suppose counsel seeks to show by cross examination that the
plaintiff is not in a blameless position, and that plaintiff is
not one that should receive equity at the hands of the court.
11R. N. J. COTRO-MANES: Where would the equity
come in if he took a trip?
MR. PAUL COTRO-MANES: Further, this February ts
after filing of the complaint for divorce.
THE COURT: Is that right?
MR. GEE: That is right, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: I don't think it is material then.
MR. GEE: It would be material if we could show the
course of action preceding it.
THE COURT: If you could show something preceding it?
MR. GEE: Yes.
THE COURT: You should begin by showing prior events,
and it might be that the circumstances after would have a
bearing with respect to credibility.
MR. GEE: It might also go to credibility, it would develop
a problem.
THE COURT: The rules with regard to the test of credibility, it seems to the court in this instance, don't justify its
receipt, and the objection is sustained" (R. 210-11).
The defendant took the stand and testified to certain
acts of the plaintiff which caused her mental distress in support
of her counter-claim ground for divorce of Mental Cruelty.
It is important to note that this is the only ground upon which
she predicated her claim for an award of the divorce to herself.
She did not amend her pleadings to come in any of the other
grounds as allowed by the Utah Statutes. In reading over her
testimony, it is to be noted that she did not once mention any
conduct of the plaintiff which caused her any mental or
physical suffering after October, 1958. How then, is anything
that occurred after October, 1958 grounds for divorce?
The examination of the plaintiff by counsel for the defendant was for the purpose of proving the grounds for divorce
as set forth by the defendant herself. As she based her claim
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upon mental cruelty, conduct which had no effect upon her
mental or physical being were not grounds for divorce as
pleaded in her counter-claim.
If the defendant wanted to go into matters which were
not pleaded in her counter-claim, she had the affirmative
duty to amend her pleadings. This was not done. To allow the
defendant to go outside of her pleadings in an attempt to
prove grounds for divorce other than those pleaded would
be to place the plaintiff in the position of having no notice
upon which he could predicate a defense.
The court recently observed:
"Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate
technicalities and liberalize procedure, we must not lose
sight of the cardinal principle that under our system
of justice, if an issue is to be tried and a party's rights
concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice
thereof and an opportunity to meet it."
Buehner Block Co. v. Gelzos, 6 U.2d 226, 310
P.2d 517 quoting the case of National Farmers Union v. Thompson, 4 U.2d 7, 286 P.2d
249.
Rule 8 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that
the complaint or counter-claim shall contain a statement of
the claim upon which the party seeks recovery.
This Court, in the case of Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 U.2d
157, 280 P.2d 453, holds that the complaint is required to
give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis
or grounds of the claim.
Rule 15 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nAmendments to conform to the Evidence," provides:
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nWhen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings."
It is apparent from the strong objections made by plaintiff
when the defendant sought to examine plaintiff as to a trip
to Mexico, and defendant's counsel having stated that he
sought to show uinfidelity" and that nplaintiff was stepping
out on defendant," that there was no consent by plaintiff,
either express or implied, to the trial of this issue.
The record discloses that the defendant did not at any
time move the court for leave to amend her pleadings to raise
the issue of adultery, although Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure allows liberal amendments. Wells v. Wells,
2 U.2d 241, 272 P.2d 167.
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of Mitchell v.
Palmer, 121 U. 245, 240 P.2d 970, held that an objection on
the grounds of immateriality and irrelevancy to the introduction
of grounds not pleaded in the complaint was proper, and that
if the other side did not move for leave to amend as provided
by Rule 15 (b), he could not properly pursue those grounds.
The court sustained the objection to the introduction of
the plaintiff's activities after the filing of the complaint on the
grounds of immateriality (R. 210) and the following day in
referring back to its previous ruling again refused to allow
any evidence of events not complained about by the defendant
or which occurred after the filing of the plaintiff's complaint.
The Court, in discussing the defendant's objections to the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, asked defendant's
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counsel to show the court any instance where the defendant,
herself, had complained of the conduct of the plaintiff during
the months of January or February, 1959. Counsel could not
do this as there '\vas nothing in the record to show that the
defendant had suffered by reason of the conduct of the plaintiff
during this period.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL AS NO SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN EFFECTED
BY ANY RULING OF THE COURT.
The defendant had her day in court. She now seeks another day. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
ccNo error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or
order in anything done or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial
or otherwise disturbing the judgment order, unless
refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."
As pointed out previously the grounds for divorce as
plead by the defendant was based upon (Cmental cruelty." Not
adultery or any other grounds as specified by 30-3-1, Utah
Code Annotated 1943 as amended. She made no complaint
about any conduct of the defendant after October, 1958.
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How then, can she complain about a substantial right
being affected by the exclusion of evidence, even if proper,
which woudl not be and could not be the basis of granting a
divorce in her favor?
The burden is upon the defendant to show that the refusal
of the court to admit the introduction of the evidence was
prejudicial. Burton v. ZCMI, 122 U. 360, 249 P.2d 514.
To what extent was the defendant prejudiced by having
the record shortened by limiting the examination on this
subject? The record shows that the plaintiff under crossexamination denied any and all associations with other women
for a period of two years immediately prior to the filing of
the complaint by the plaintiff (R. 209-210). What further
benefit could the defendant have derived from further denials
by the plaintiff? The defendant did not offer to put on any
other witness, other than the plaintiff himself, to show misconduct on his part, and then the defendant did not complain
of any actions of his during the time that counsel for defendant
sought to go into.
Defendant, in an attempt to get her ((other day in court"
now seeks to use the trial court's refusal to go into events,
not complained about by the defendant, as a means of obtaining
a new trial, by charging error.
The Supreme Court of Utah has set forth the basis upon
which a trial court may grant a new trial.
In the case of Startin v. Madsen, 120 U. 631, 237 P.2d 834,
the Court said:
((We must keep uppermost in mind the provtston
of our statute. See 104-14-7, UCA, 1943. The Court
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must * * * disregard any error * * * which does not
affect the substantial rights of the parties and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such
error or defect. See Rule 61, U.R.C.P., to the same
effect. Before the appellant is entitled to previa!, he
must show both error and prejudice; that is, that his
substantial rights are affected, and that there is at least
a fair likelihood that the result would have been
different. (Citing cases). Even if incompetent evidence
is admitted, unless it is harmful to defendant, it is not
grounds for reversal." (Citing cases) .
The much cited case of Crellin v. Thomas, 122 U. 122,
247 P.2d 264, in discussing the granting of a new trial on the
grounds of newly discovered exidence, held:

***

the exercise of judicial discretion in such
instance must be based on a showing of substantial
material evidence, from which it appears there is at
least a reasonable likelihood that it would affect the
result of a new trial." (Emphasis ours).
(C

See also Uptown Appliance v. Flint, 123 U. 153, 249 P.2d
826, to the same effect.
Even if there has been error tn excluding the evidence,
the court should not grant a new trial as to the facts, if the
court was satisfied with the facts, but merely allow the issue
of the law to be retried. Tebbs & Tebbs v. Oliveto, 123 U. 153,
256 P.2d 699. In the case now before the court, the trial court
was satisfied with the facts of the case and therefore the only
question would be one of law, and there was no question of
law involved, as the defendant had failed and refused to
amend her pleadings to allege any ground for divorce which,
in light of the evidence adduced, would have been basis for
awarding the defendant the divorce.
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The appellant cites many cases with regard to the introduction of evidence of grounds for divorce which occurred
after the filing of plaintiff's complaint and before the filing
of defendant's counter-claim. It is submitted that this is
proper, and the trial court should permit the introduction
which would go to prove the allegations of the defendant's
counter-claim, however the evidence sought to be introduced
must go to the proof of those allegations. The Supreme Court
of Tennessee, (Schwalb v. Schwalb, 282 SW, 2d 661, 1955),
held that matters may be considered by the court which occurred
after the filing of the divorce action, if incorporated into the
action by amendment or supplemental bill.
The Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of Raymond
v. Raymond ( 1957), 132 A.2d 427, held that the events
occurring after the filing of the complaint must be incorporated
into the action by amendment of pleadings. The court stated
further that it is a prerequisite that the other party be appraised
of the grounds upon which the party asserting the later events
is relying, and that if the other party is not appraised, by
amendment or its equivalent, the introduction of evidence
of such later events is objectionable.
The defendant sought to show infidelity, but did not
plead this as a grounds for divorce, nor did she testify as to
any infidelity of the plaintiff, nor did she testify as to any
suffering because of the actions of the plaintiff after October,
1958. What then, is the prejudice to the plaintiff? As pointed
out before, plaintiff denied any infidelity on cross-examination
by defendant's counsel (R. 209-210).
Defendant attempts in her brief to make something out
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of the form of the objection made by plaintiffs counsel. Defendant ignores the court's ruling made the previous day on
the same issue ( R. 211) and ignores the fact that the court
referred back to its previous ruling. The objection made on
one ground was that the matter was not within the pleadings (R. 210).
Rule 15 (b) provides:

" * * * If evidence is objected to at the trial on. the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails ot satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defendant upon the merits."
Again it is pointed out that defendant did not seek to
enlarge the grounds upon which she sought a divorce. As to
credibility, the record shows the statements of the plaintiff.
Defendant offered no proof, either through her own statements
or through the testimony of other witnesses to question the
credibility of the plaintiff. How then could this line of questioning attack the credibility of the plaintiff ?
Defendant's counsel was specifically asked by the court
the basis for his questioning the plaintiff about his whereabouts
in February, 1959, and counsel admitted that it was to show
infidelity, thereupon the court made the same ruling as it had
on the previous day, and sustained plaintiff's objections to the
line of questioning.
The law is clear that in a divorce action, the court may
grant a divorce only upon the grounds as alleged in the com-
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plaint or counter-claim. As stated in the Alabama case of
Rudicell v. Rudicell ( 1955) 77 So.2d 339:
((While evidence tending to show acts of illicit sexual
intercourse between defendant and others subsequent
to the filing of the bill was admissible when oIf ered
in connection with or subsequent to the introduction
of evidence tending to show adulterous intercourse
between the pa'f'ties during the time covered by the
averments of t.he bill, the right to relief must rest upon
proof of the adulterous intercourse charged in the
bill." (Emphasis ours).
See also Renner v. Renner (1940) Maryland, 12 A.2d 195,
127 A.L.R. 674; Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 100 Am Dec
110; Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 U. 178, 257 P.2d 366;
Gilmore v. Gilmore, ____ Cal. ____ , 287 P.2d 769.
This Court has ruled that recrimination in a divorce action
has been discarded. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 U. 178, 257
P.2d 366; Curry v. Curry, 7 U.2d 198, 321 P.2d 939; Griffeths
v. Griffeths, 3 U.2d 82, 278 P.2d 983. The New Mexico
Supreme Court has gone into the historical background and
has ruled that it had no basis in modern divorce law. Pavletich
v. Payletich, ____ NM ____ , 174 P.2d 826. In that case the trial
court announced:
nAt this time I may as well state that I do not intend
to make a finding of adultery, because I do not believe
that adultery existing after a separation and state of
incompatibility, with the parties living separate and
apart, is material to the decision of the court in granting a divorce * * * ."
This was affirmed by the Supreme Court, which ruled
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"The trial Court, therefore, correctly ruled that the
question of adultery of appellant (Plaintiff, husband)
was immaterial."

POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF WAS A RESIDENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
FOR MORE THAN THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION.
The defendant's contention under Point III of her brief
may be likened to that of a drowning man reaching for a
straw to support himself upon.
It is interesting to note that defendant admitted in her
answer dated February 10, 1959, that the plaintiff was a
resident of Salt Lake County and had been for more than
three months prior to filing the action. (See Answer and
Amended Answer) .
It is also interesting to note that the defendant did not
request the court to amend its Findings of Fact with regard
to this fact.
The record abounds with evidence and testimony of both
plaintiff (R. 145) and defendant as to the fact that the
plaintiff was engaged in business in Salt Lake City and had
been since 1952, that the plaintiff and defendant lived on
State Street from 1952 until 1957, when they moved to Country
Club Drive where they lived until the time of the filing of
the divorce in 1959. The residency of the plaintiff in Salt
Lake County since 1952 was established beyond any doubt
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and the trial court so found. Where there are facts upon
which the trial court could base its findings the appellate
court will not disturb those findings. The law and cases have
established this beyond the necessity of citing authority.

POIN~f

IV.

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF
WAS THE OWNER OF STOCK OF GUNSITE BUTTE
URANIUM CORPORATION.
Defendant, in her brief, for the first time, raises a point
that the plaintiff was the owner of 36,000 shares of stock of
Gunsite Butte Uranium Corporation, valued at $1,080.00.
Defendant did not request the trial court to make a finding
that the plaintiff was the owner of this stock, but raises this
issue for the first time upon appeal.
Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 and No. 2 show that the stock
was purchased by check by Vrontikis Brothers Company, and
Mr. Vrontikis testified that the only reason that the stock was
issued in his name was that, upon advice of Mr. Kane of
Hogle's, it would be easier to have it in the name of an individual instead of in the name of a corporation (R. 184).
The owner of the stock was V rontikis Brothers, Incorporated
(R. 184). This evidence was not disputed.

POINT V.
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT BONUS PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF BY VRONTIKIS BROTHERS
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CORPORATION WERE DIVIDENDS IS NOT BASED
UPON FACT, LAW, OR REASON.
Defendant in Point IV of her brief alleges that the
payment of bonuses to the plaintiff were dividend payments
by the corporation. Defendant did not submit any evidence to
substantiate this, such as corporate records or books, but merely
makes statements not founded on facts, law or common usage
of words.
The plaintiff testified that,
nin our work for over seven years we worked seven
days a week, eight hours work is routine for most
people. I put in more hours than most people do. I
have a lot of work to do. I might be unloading, I
might be loading, I might be making out contracts,
I might be selling~ making advertising, I might be
doing one of a dozen functions and for that and for
those services if the corporation thinks it is worth
their while they will give me a bonus." (R. 289).
A bonus is not a dividend. A bonus paid by a corporation
is not a gift or gratuity, but a sum paid for services or on a
consideration or in addition to that which ordinarily be given.
Diamond v. Davis, 38 NYS.2d 103, 113; Adams v. MidWest Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147; Lakos
v. Saliaris, CCA Md. 116 F.2d 440, 442; Payne v. United
States, 269 F. 871.
The term udividend," as applied to corporations in a
legal sense and as generally understood in common usage,
means earnings or profits which are distributed in proportion
to the shares of stock in the cruporation owned by the several
stockholders. In Re Romney's Estate, 60 U. 173, 207 P. 139.
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The record does not disclose that all stockholders of
the corporation received bonuses, and even if they had, the
record does not disclose what work they did to receive them.
Defendant complains that the court refused to order the
plaintiff to answer certain interrogatories and thereby she
was prejudiced. Had she proceeded, by use of Rule 26, 31
and 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, she could have obtained
this informaiton from the Corporation.
Defendant could have, through diligence, ascertained
all that she now seeks to claim prejudice for not having
ascertained. She charges the court with error in finding the
value of the V rontikis Brothers, Incorporated, stock to be 1Oc
per share, but she did not put on any evidence to rebutt the
testimony and evidence of plaintiff whatsoever.
Defendant asserts that par value of the stock of the
corporation fixes the value of the stock.

* * * a statement of par value, in shares, has little
or no real significance.''
ct

11 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations,
Perm Ed 185, Sect 5125.

teA Court judicially knows that the par value of stock
is very often in excess of its actual cash or market
value."
I. 0. Painter Fertilizer Co. v. Foss
107 Fla, 464, 145 So 253
Mr. Justice Stone of the Supreme Court of the United
States summarized this argument by stating:
((Par value and actual value of issued stock are not
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synonymous, and there is often a wide disparity between them."
People v. Latrobe
279 U.S. 421, 73 L.Ed 776, 49 S. Ct. 377
65 ALR 1341, 1346
The value of the stock is
"constantly in a state of fluctuation as the business
prospers or declines.''
13 Am Jur 302, Corporations, Sec 177.

Therefore the court must rely upon the evidence of the
value of the stock. That value, which was uncontroverted by
defendant, was 1Oc per share, or a total to plaintiff, provided
a buyer could be obtained, of $1,000.00.
All of defendants cited atuhority admits that where there
is evidence of the value of the stock, the par value has no
significance. There \Vas evidence as to the value and this
evidence was not challenged. Had defendant wished to
challenge the evidence she had the means, through proper
usage of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to do so.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WILL NOT BE DIS-·
TURBED ON APPEAL UNLESS A CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IS SHOWN.
The law is clear and well settled that the trial court has
discretion to award such alimony as it sees fit and its decision
will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of
abuse. Blair v. Blair, 40 U. 306, 121 P. 19; Bullen v. Bullen,

23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

71 U. 63, 262 P. 292; Friedli v. Friedli, 65 U. 605, 238 P.
647; Lawlor v. Lawlor, 121 U. 201, 240 P.2d 271; Pfaff v.
Pfaff, 121 U. 277, 241 P.2d 156.

SUMMARY

We submit that the judgment of the court below awarding
plaintiff respondent a divorce and the settlement of property
and alimony to the defendant appellant is just and proper under
the evidence and that the findings of the court and its decree
which is based upon substantial evidence was correct and as
a matter of law the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CO'IRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
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